What Effects Do Public Relations Actions Have on Labor Disputes? A Look at Corporate Campaigns by Bergin, Amie E.
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Seminar Research Paper Series Schmidt Labor Research Center
2005
What Effects Do Public Relations Actions Have on
Labor Disputes? A Look at Corporate Campaigns
Amie E. Bergin
University of Rhode Island
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series
This Seminar Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Schmidt Labor Research Center at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Seminar Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bergin, Amie E., "What Effects Do Public Relations Actions Have on Labor Disputes? A Look at Corporate Campaigns" (2005).
Seminar Research Paper Series. Paper 15.
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/15http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/15
  
WHAT EFFECTS DO PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIONS HAVE ON LABOR DISPUTES? 
A LOOK AT CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 
AMIE E. BERGIN 
University of Rhode Island 
 
Strikes were once considered an effective “go to” weapon in the labor movement. As union density has 
declined, so has the frequency and effectiveness of strikes. Strikes were once a tried and true tactic for labor unions 
to force employers to make concessions at the bargaining table. However over the past twenty-five years strikes 
have become a somewhat risky gamble with uncertain, often disastrous results. This paper examines the new role of 
public relations campaigns that labor unions employ in bargaining as it relates to work stoppages. What, if any, 
pressures do these “corporate campaigns” exert on employers during work stoppages? Do they help labor unions 
further their objectives? Do they force employers to make concessions in order to avoid a strike or to quickly end a 
strike? 
 
THE DECLINE IN WORK STOPPAGES 
The strike or threat of a strike has traditionally 
been the most effective leverage available to labor 
unions to pressure an employer during collective 
bargaining negotiations (Susser 1989). The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) began tracking work 
stoppages that involved more than 1,000 workers 
in the year 1947. At the height of strike activity in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the BLS routinely recorded 
work stoppages involving more than 1,000 
workers at numbers that regularly approached or 
exceeded 400 strikes annually (Statistics 2005). 
During this period of frequent labor stoppages 
there was no doubt that there would be strikes. The 
uncertainty revolved around whether the strikes 
would be endorsed by the local union or if they 
would be unendorsed wildcat strikes (Brecher 
1997). During that time in labor history, labor 
unions made a number of impressive gains in 
terms of wages, healthcare, insurance, and pension 
benefits through the collective bargaining process 
(Zieger 1986).   
Strike Ineffectiveness 
Social Conflict. As the anti-war and the civil 
rights movements progressed throughout the 
1960s, the American public increasingly turned its 
attention to these and other matters of social and 
public policy and focused less attention on the 
concerns of the labor movement that had 
dominated the previous decade (Zieger 1986). The 
social turmoil of that decade brought every 
American institution under attack, and despite the 
gains that had been made for workers since the 
National Labor Relations Act was passed into law 
in 1935, unions were not exempt from the 
scrutiny. Charges of racism and corruption among 
labor unions damaged the credibility that the labor 
movement had fought so hard to gain and the 
frequency and seemingly arbitrary use of strikes as 
a means of collective bargaining began to 
undermine labor’s legitimacy (Manheim 2001, 
Zieger 1986). The issues of the labor movement 
and its members, while still aligned with those of 
the American public, took a backseat to other 
issues during that period, most notably civil rights 
and the Vietnam conflict. 
Permanent Replacements. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case 
N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. that 
employers could replace workers who took part in 
a work stoppage for economic reasons. In its 
decision, the Court was extremely careful to draw 
the distinction between strikes for economic 
purposes, particularly when negotiations break 
down despite the employers good faith bargaining, 
and those that take place as a result of an unfair 
labor practice by an employer. Employers used 
permanent replacements as a means to maintain 
production during work stoppages sparingly until 
the early 1980s. In 1981, the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) struck 
in response to stalled negotiations with the Federal 
Aviation Association (FAA). After the striking 
workers failed to return to work upon a directive 
from then President Ronald Reagan, the President 
fired the entire workforce and permanently 
replaced them. The use of permanent replacements 
by the federal government in response to a strike 
had not been done since the Great Depression 
(Brecher 1997). Although PATCO’s members 
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were federal employees and thus engaged in an 
illegal strike, the use of replacement workers by 
the federal government lent credibility to this 
practice for other employers, particularly those in 
the private sector (Masters 1997). Following 
Regan’s use of replacement workers, employers in 
increasing numbers began to do the same in order 
to maintain productivity during a strike and defeat 
the striking workers and the union (Manheim 
2001).   
While labor unions had often used the threat 
of a strike to pressure employers and secure a  
settlement at the bargaining table, employers have 
in turn increasingly used the threat of permanent 
replacements to head off a strike by the union 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan et al. 1998). The 
use of permanent replacements can turn a strike 
into long term job loss for employees and has, in 
some cases, lead to the destruction of the local 
union. The labor movement has spent untold time 
and resources trying to pass legislation to prohibit 
the use of permanent replacements. To date they 
have not been successful in their efforts, and 
employers’ use of permanent replacements to fill 
the production gap left by striking workers 
continues to have a chilling effect on the number 
of strikes in the United States. Larger firms are 
able to withstand the negative impacts of strikes 
on business and production longer than labor 
unions and striking workers in part because they 
are able to quickly hire replacement workers, 
giving them a significant advantage (Rose 1991). 
While the number of strikes had steadily declined 
thorough the late 1970’s, strikes began to plummet 
in numbers after the PATCO strike and in 2003 
the BLS recorded only 14 strikes (BLS Data 
2004).  
Union Density. The decline in the number of 
strikes can in part be attributed to declining 
number of union members (Susser 1989). Union 
membership is currently 12.5% nationally, the 
lowest level since the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) began keeping tracking this data (Labor 
Relations Reporter 2005). The dwindling number 
of union members makes it increasingly difficult 
for labor unions to strike in the large numbers they 
once did, further eroding solidarity among 
members during a strike and the financial impact 
of a strike on an employer, further increasing the 
employers ability to withstand the strike. 
Media Coverage. Some researchers have 
suggested that media coverage of strikes and other 
union activities are biased and favor employers 
(Flynn 2000). In the period between 1946 and 
1985, one study found that media coverage 
concentrated more on strike activity than any other 
union activity and that media reports exaggerated 
the frequency of strikes (Schmidt 1993). Most 
importantly Schmidt noted that media coverage 
appeared to have an overall negative effect on the 
public opinion of labor unions. Consequently 
while the number of strikes has declined 
drastically, media coverage of strikes has risen and 
the American public’s disapproval of labor unions 
has increased. 
It is clear that striking is no longer an effective 
means of pressuring employers at the bargaining 
table. The American public and the media have 
shifted their focus away from the labor movement 
to that of other social and public policy concerns. 
Employers are much more resistant to strikes as a 
result of declining union membership and their 
increased willingness to use of replacement 
workers. The decline in the number of strikes 
coupled with numerous highly publicized failed 
strikes has reinforced the public view that this 
once crippling union tactic has, as a stand alone 
measure, lost its effectiveness (Masters 1997). 
A NEW TACTIC: THE CORPORATE 
CAMPAIGN 
By the early 1980’s, labor unions had begun to 
experiment with corporate style campaigns during 
bargaining (Franklin 2001). Unions recognized 
that they needed more effective methods to 
pressure employers at during collective bargaining 
negotiations, as strikes and even picket lines were 
no longer effective. Slowly unions began to realize 
that they could put pressure on employers by 
pressuring their stakeholders. Stakeholders include 
employees, customers, investors, vendors and 
suppliers, stockholders, presidents and board 
members, business partners and customers 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001).  Unions 
recognized that the battles they waged needed to 
be about more than just wages and working 
conditions - they needed issues that possessed both 
social and moral appeal to attract a larger group of 
supporters for their efforts, namely religious and 
community groups and leaders (Franklin 2001).   
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The term corporate campaign is defined by 
Jarol B. Manheim as follows:  
A coordinated, often long-term, and wide-
ranging program of economic, political, legal 
and psychological warfare usually, but not 
exclusively, initiated by a union or by organized 
labor in general.  It is directed against a 
corporation that has opposed unionization, 
declined to accept contract terms a union deems 
critical, or in some other way refused to yield on 
some issue of great importance to the 
organization launching the campaign…it is  
warfare waged in the media, where the union or 
other group seek to redefine the image and 
undermine the  reputation of the target 
company through systematic and unrelenting 
pressure…to cause so much pain and disruption 
that management is forced to yield to their will. 
Manheim offered this definition in The Death 
of a Thousand Cuts in 2001.  By that time, labor 
unions had identified a number of public relations 
based tactics which could be used to pressure 
employers at the bargaining table that did not 
revolve solely around work stoppages. Unions 
began to employ corporate campaigns 
intermittently in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
but it wasn’t until the 1990’s that the labor 
movement began to perfect and rely upon these 
public relations efforts as a means of pressuring 
employers for purposes of collective bargaining. 
Since that time, corporate campaigns have become 
a conventional weapon in labor’s organizing and 
bargaining efforts (Manheim 2001). The following 
section of this paper examines how and why 
corporate style campaigns are successful in 
pressuring employers. 
Corporate campaigns attempt to influence 
employers by pressuring the employer’s 
stakeholders. This is a departure from strikes, 
which attempt to pressure the employer alone. In 
addition to the earlier definition of stakeholders 
offered by Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001), they 
extend the definition of stakeholders as any person 
or organization that can affect or is affected by the 
organization and their objectives.  As it is 
generally accepted that companies are dependant 
upon their stakeholders for survival, it follows that 
they will pay attention to them in order to insure 
their survival.  The more dependants an 
organization is on its stakeholders, the greater 
power the stakeholders have over the company 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001).   
For stakeholders to exert their influence on a 
company they must posses three attributes: power, 
legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell, et. al. 1997).  
As discussed above, stakeholders have significant 
influence when the company is dependant upon 
them for its survival. When unions themselves do 
not have power, they can gain power by 
influencing other stakeholders to exert pressure on 
the employer.  Legitimacy and urgency, for the 
purposes of this paper, have to do with the 
demands that a stakeholder makes to the company 
on a labor union’s behalf. These demands must be 
viewed as responsible and justified in light of the 
existing circumstances. Otherwise the company 
and its stakeholders will not view the demands as 
being so imperative as to warrant a concession. 
Finally, demands must be urgent. Urgency takes 
place when a matter is time sensitive or of the 
utmost importance. During a corporate campaign, 
unions must present a compelling case to other 
stakeholder in order to pressure them to take 
action against the employer. These three attributes 
are paramount to a union’s effort to gain allies 
who will exert pressure on a company they might 
otherwise have a good relationship with to make 
concessions to the union. 
Ray Rogers is widely considered to be the 
father of the use of the corporate campaign by the 
labor movement. Rogers worked for a number of 
labor unions throughout his career and is currently 
the president Corporate Campaign, Inc. His New 
York based company develops corporate 
campaigns exclusively for labor unions.  The 
campaigns focus on internal union solidarity, 
membership and family involvement and 
generating favorable media coverage to help labor 
unions gain leverage during collective bargaining 
negotiations. Rogers is credited with pioneering 
labors employ of the corporate campaign in the 
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
(ACTWU) organizing campaign against the 
notoriously anti-union J.P. Stevens & Co. from 
1976 to 1980 (Manheim 2001). He has been 
involved in a number of high-profile corporate 
campaigns throughout his career and Corporate 
Campaign, Inc. has been featured in such 
publications as Time, Business Week, Forbes, 
Fortune, The Wall Street Journal, The New York 
Times, Newsday, USA Today, The Washington 
Post as well as a number of television programs. 
Time magazine wrote the following about Rogers 
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and his company: (Rogers has) "brought some of 
the most powerful corporations to their knees, and 
his ideas are spreading" (Brecher 1997, Corporate 
Campaign, Inc.). Rogers continues to be active in 
this area on behalf of labor unions. 
HOW DO “CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS” 
WORK? 
As stated earlier, corporate campaigns are an 
attempt by a labor union to pressure an employer 
by compelling their stakeholders into action 
against the employers on behalf of the union. 
These campaigns attempt to influence stakeholders 
to exert pressure on companies, in an attempt to 
force employers to yield to the demands of the 
union. Research and strategy play a key role in 
corporate campaigns.  During a campaign labor 
unions research companies finances (vendors, 
creditors, and investors), stakeholder (board of 
directors, customers, managers and executives), 
employment practices (compensation, health & 
safety) and other matters relevant to the 
company’s union employees (Manheim 2001).  
The research has two goals.  The first is to find a 
weakness within the company that the union may 
publicly exploit to gain the attention of the 
stakeholders. This can sometimes have nothing to 
do with the matter at issue during collective 
bargaining. During the Teamsters wildly 
successful strike of UPS in 1997, the union was 
able to pressure the company and gain the 
sympathy of the general public by publicizing the 
fact that the company had an injury rate that was 
2.5 times higher than the industry average. The 
rate of injuries was central to the Teamsters 
campaign against UPS, but the main dispute at the 
bargaining table concerned health insurance 
coverage and the unions’ demand that UPS offer 
more full-time, benefits eligible employment 
opportunities, not worker safety (Brecher 1997).  
Research is the first and often most important step 
in a corporate campaign. 
The role of public opinion and the media 
Public opinion plays a significant role in the 
influence of labor unions at the bargaining table. 
Negative opinions of unions rose sharply after 
1972 and have remained somewhat high ever since 
(Schmidt 1993). Public opinion polls demonstrate 
that while the majority of Americans approve of 
labor unions representation of employees, many 
feel unions are too powerful, self-serving, lead by 
persons who are untrustworthy and engage in too 
many strikes (Jarley 1994). In that same study 
Jarley noted that the public views strikes as an 
unsavory tactic and generally support initiatives 
designed to reduce the frequency and duration of 
strikes such as cooling-off periods, limits on strike 
duration and the right of effected third parties to 
recover lost income as a result of a strike.  
Media coverage of strikes (or lack thereof) 
also contributes to the public opinions about labor 
unions. The media is more likely to cover an 
interest based dispute rather than one involving an 
allegation of an unfair labor practice, and work 
stoppages involving a large number of employees 
are more likely to garner the media’s interest.  The 
size and duration of a strike also have a positive 
effect on media coverage. Further, some research 
has shown that as the number of strikes decline, so 
does the amount of coverage that remaining labor 
activities get, as the media may deem union-
related coverage to be less important to its readers 
(Erickson 1996). It has also been shown that labor 
disputes in certain industries such as transportation 
or public utilities receive greater media attention 
than others, such as the garment industry (Flynn 
2000). This may be in part because these jobs are 
specialized are not able to be outsourced to either 
permanent replacements or plants overseas. 
Further, strikes in these industries tend to greatly 
affect the public welfare. Media attention to labor 
disputes involving the threat of a work stoppage 
has been shown to not only increase the likelihood 
of a strike but also to increase the duration of the 
strike if one takes place (Flynn 2000). Strike 
activity is often seen by the public in a negative 
view, and thus it has a negative effect on union 
approval (Jarley 1994). Therefore, any action must 
be closely linked to the issue at hand (Turner 
2001).  
While this research suggests that labor unions 
are not playing on a level field with employers in 
terms of favorable media attention, this author 
would propose that the numerous recent scandals 
involving corporations may have leveled the 
playing field somewhat. Only time will tell, but it 
is safe to say that in many cases unions begin their 
campaigns at a considerable disadvantage in terms 
of public opinion. However, the threat of negative 
publicity can be most effective on employers who 
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routinely tout their positive working conditions to 
the media and the public (Turner 2001). In terms 
of the legitimacy of their efforts, unions should be 
especially concerned that the public believes that 
they are pursuing reasonable goals. 
How do unions get their message out? 
As union membership continues to decline, 
more of the American public gets their 
information about unions from the media rather 
than from union members (Jarley 1994). 
Commentators note that since the 1940s, media 
coverage of labor unions and labor disputes has 
not only decreased, but it has moved from the 
front page of the newspaper to the back page of 
the business section (Jarley 1994). Further, 
reporters are no longer versed in the ways of union 
life. Because the quantity and quality of reporting 
on labor issues has decreased, labor unions must 
find alternate ways to get their message to the 
American public.  
Generating positive media coverage. 
To garner media coverage, organizations must 
be involved in something deemed to be worth 
reporting by the news media (Schmidt 1993).  As 
discussed earlier, media coverage increasingly 
tends to focus on strike activity, over which the 
public generally expresses disapproval, and less on 
collective bargaining and other union initiatives. 
Thus it can be inferred that typical union activities 
such as collective bargaining and public education 
initiatives are not of interest to the general public 
or the media, while more dramatic events are, such 
as strikes. Because sensational media coverage 
gains the attention of the general public, unions 
must take great care to ensure that their message is 
legitimate in order to stave off negative reactions 
from the public. This is particularly important 
because media coverage has been shown to have 
the greatest impact on the opinions of persons 
otherwise tend to have little or no opinion about 
labor unions (Schmidt 1993). Furthermore, as the 
influence of the media has grown over the past 
two decades, researchers have tracked a decline in 
favorable coverage of labor union by the media 
(Puette 1992).  The public view of labor unions is 
generally lumped together by the public. Thus the 
way that an individual views one labor union 
generally reflects how that person views labor 
unions and the labor movement as a whole (Puette 
1992). 
The Justice for Janitors, which has become the 
icon of the new labor movement, was exceedingly 
successful in generating positive media coverage. 
SEIU faced significant employer oppositions and 
public apathy when it began its campaign to 
organize janitors in Los Angeles in the early 
1990s. The Union carefully built a media strategy 
that was able to portray the janitors, who were by 
and large immigrants, as the symbol of the 
working poor and contrasted them with the 
wealthy executives whose offices they cleaned. 
The Union was successful in organizing the 
janitors in 1991 and in renegotiating their contract 
in 1995 but faced significant hurdles during the 
2000 collective bargaining negotiations. The 
janitors were employed by cleaning contractors, 
whose services were contracted by building 
owners throughout the city. The building owners 
were free from the pressures of collective 
bargaining, as they could simply switch to a non-
union contractor if wages were raised by more 
than they cared to pay. In 2000, the Union was 
demanding a $1.00 per hour wage increase, while 
the building owners had only offered $0.50. When 
compared to the building owners and occupying 
executives’ salaries, the amount seemed 
insignificant to the public and their sympathies 
were firmly on the side of the workers. 
Additionally, mass rallies and pickets were 
organized by the union.  The rallies took place at 
night because this was when the janitors were 
scheduled to work.  It also allowed the 
demonstrations to go forward in a way that was 
not disruptive to the public at large. This all-out 
assault on the position of the employer by the 
community resulted in overwhelming public 
sympathy from a city that often seemed hostile 
towards immigrants and caused the building 
owners to cave to the Union’s demands in less 
than three weeks (Erickson, et. Al 2002).   
The Internet. Labor unions have increasingly 
turned to the Internet to get their message out to 
the public.  The Internet allows labor unions to 
spread their message in a way that is unfettered by 
their adversaries. While those who view a labor 
unions website are generally persons who are 
sympathetic to labor, these sites offer unlimited 
information on any number of corporate 
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campaigns that the unions are engaged in.  The 
AFL-CIO’s website includes a section entitled 
“Eye on Corporate America”.  The website 
contains detailed information on a variety of 
corporate campaigns against companies like Wal-
Mart contains information on company ownership, 
executive compensation, employer practices and 
employee pay.  According to a senior research 
analyst with SEIU, the union increasingly uses 
web campaigns as a tactic because it is a cost 
effective way to target multiple companies at the 
same time (MacFadyen 2004).  SEIU pressured 
GTCR and its portfolio companies through a 
website called “GTCR Watch” in 1996 rather than 
striking or filing legal charges.  The website 
highlighted what the Union considered to be poor 
management practices and alleged fraud at their 
portfolio companies.  While that campaign is 
ongoing, executives at GTCR have made public 
statements distancing themselves from one such 
company, AnswerThink Inc. (MacFadyen 2004).   
Union Handbooks. Union handbooks provide 
information about corporate campaigns and a 
variety of legal methods which instruct members 
about methods at their disposal to apply pressure 
on the employer from inside the firm. Slowdowns 
and work-to-rule campaigns were standard 
pressure tactics used by labor unions in the 1930s 
and have been revived as strikes have grown less 
effective. In 1986 the AFL-CIO published a one 
such member handbook called The Inside Game. 
Demand was so strong the AFL-CIO eventually 
printed and distributed over 100,000 copies of this 
manual (Brecher 1997). The manual’s stated 
objective is to “assist unions large and small in 
devising strategies targeted at employer economic 
and political relationship – including dealings with 
other union, shareholders, customers, creditors, 
elected officials, government agencies and the 
general public” in order to persuade the employer 
that the cost of not reaching an agreement with the 
union will be more costly to them than the price of 
the unions bargaining demands (Inside the Game, 
Yates 1998). Other unions publish similar 
manuals, including SEIU’s Contract Campaign 
Manual and the CWA’s Mobilizing for the 90s. 
Besides offering pressure tactics these manuals 
promote the message that a united workforce 
brings power to the union (Yates 1998). All of 
these manuals instruct rank-and-file union 
members with regard to one of the most frequently 
used tactics of a corporate campaign - work-to-
rule strategies. These manual also urges union 
members to recruit volunteers from outside the 
company to flood the firm with calls related to 
collective bargaining measures. They include 
information about recruitment, the importance of 
well thought out and clearly defined goals, 
timetables for reached the goals, and research in 
defining goals. They cover how to gather 
information about the company, particularly 
financial information and the value of disgruntled 
employees as sources. These strategies are part of 
a greater approach to pressure employers to 
concede to the union’s demands at the bargaining 
table (Susser 1989).  
Coalition building. Unions have begun to 
form new partnerships with unlikely alliances in 
an attempt to increase their power base. The so-
called Blue-Green alliance between labor unions 
and environmental groups is one such example 
(Turner 2004).  This improbable alliance allows 
labor unions to reach constituents who otherwise 
would not turn out in force in support of the causes 
of the labor movement. The alliance spreads 
labor’s message to environmental groups, a group 
that has also placed corporate America in their 
crosshairs, but for different reason. For example, 
labor and environmentalist groups have joined 
forces to fight President Bush’s plans for drilling 
in the ANWAR region of Alaska, an effort that 
would not normally be considered an issue of 
concern to labor unions (Turner 2004).  In fact, 
labor unions have begun to ally themselves with 
women’s groups, human and civil rights activists 
and consumer protection advocates as a means of 
recruiting supporters (Turner 2004). Additionally, 
labor unions have courted the anti-sweatshop 
movement, as both groups have publicly stated 
their interest in curtailing the use of labor in 
underdeveloped countries where poor labor 
standards often make it cheaper to manufacture a 
variety of products, which unions often blame for 
draining jobs away from America (Turner 2004). 
As they say, politics makes strange, and in this 
case powerful, bedfellows.  
Labor has increasingly turned to religious 
organizations with regard to its coalition building 
efforts.  Ray Rogers’s company, Corporate 
Campaigns, Inc., advertises that it maintains a 
network of various religious organizations of all 
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faiths (Corporate Campaign, Inc.). John Sweeney, 
the president of the AFL-CIO, is a devout catholic 
and called for a closer alliance between unions and 
religious groups and went so far to set up the 
National Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice 
(Manheim 2001). The Committee boasts a 
network of 40 organizations in 24 states that 
support labor and social justice activities at the 
local level (Manheim 2001). It highlights the 
participation of religious groups’ participation in 
labor activity, sets forth a code of conduct for 
those activities and lobbies for compensation and 
health and safety issues and against discrimination 
in the workplace based on faith and ethnicity 
(Manheim 2001). These affiliations and 
organizations have been important with regard to 
corporate campaigns and strikes at the local level. 
Supporters of corporate campaigns have 
included not only the groups mentioned above, but 
also the United Methodist Church, the National 
Baptist Convention, the National Consumer 
League, Children Against Underage Servitude and 
Employment, the National Council of Churches, 
the National Organization for Women, the 
Rainbow Coalition, and the Rainforest Action 
Network (Manheim 2001).  In the late 1970s the 
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
spent almost five (5) years locked in a battle with 
J.P. Stevens trying to organize its workers, many 
of whom were African-American women. In the 
first identifiable corporate campaign of its kind, 
the union was able to use their alliances with civil 
rights and women’s group to pressure the 
company and its stakeholders over the duration of 
the campaign (Brecher 1997). 
The living wage movement and the Justice for 
Janitors campaigns are perfect examples of the 
effectiveness of these coalitions.  The labor 
movement has joined forces with civil rights 
organizations, community groups, local churches 
and political organizations and their efforts have 
resulted in the passage of living wage ordinances 
in over 70 cities (Turner 2004). During the Justice 
for Janitors campaigns in Los Angeles SEIU was 
able to assemble a coalition consisting of local and 
national labor unions including the Los Angeles 
Building Trades Council and Los Angeles County 
Federation of Labor, religious groups, community 
activists and political organizations.  The support 
that these groups lent to the janitors in their 
organizing efforts and during the strike was 
immeasurable. The Catholic Church held masses 
in honor of the janitors and Cardinal Roger 
Mahoney publicly offered to mediate the strike. 
The Teamsters refused to collect trash from the 
buildings where the janitors worked and the 
Operating Engineers refused to perform any 
maintenance on them.  During the strike the Los 
Angeles County Federation of Labor organized a 
food distribution program for striking workers, 
and the Los Angeles City Council, Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors and the California 
State Assembly passed resolutions to support the 
demands of the union (Erickson, et. Al 2002). The 
Justice for Janitors corporate campaigns 
demonstrate that the support that labor unions can 
derive from non-labor causes can be of significant 
importance during a corporate campaign. The 
leverage that these groups apply to employers and 
opinion leaders can help to sway public opinion 
and place further pressure on employers.   
MOBILIZING SUPPORT 
Laying the groundwork in the community. 
The success of the Los Angeles Justice for 
Janitors campaigns rests in large part with the 
work that was done in the community long before 
the public campaign began. Their efforts focused 
on the creating the ability to influence public 
opinion, not the employer. Union organizers began 
contacting potential allies one year before 
contacting the employers with regard to organizing 
their workers. By that time they had secured the 
support of other labor unions, religious, 
community and political leaders, all of whom 
publicly supported their campaign (Erickson, et. 
Al 2002). The importance of support from the 
community can not be underestimated during a 
corporate campaign, as is demonstrated by the 
examples provided in this paper.    
During the 1997 Teamsters strike against UPS, 
customer relationships were widely publicized by 
the Union in their media efforts (Guy 2003). 
Because UPS drivers worked regular routs, many 
had a familiar relationship with their customers. 
Prior to the strike, the Teamsters union encouraged 
their members to speak directly to customers about 
the dispute and education them with regard to the 
union’s position (Guy 2003). When the strike 
began on August 4, 1997, it was the largest strike 
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that the United States had seen in 20 years 
(Brecher 1997). The Union’s efforts of educating 
customers prior to the dispute had paid off – a 
USA Today/CNN Gallup Poll showed that 55% of 
respondents supported the union while only 27% 
supported UPS. After 15 days the company, which 
was scheduled to meet to discuss a proposal to 
bring in replacement workers, instead announced a 
settlement with the Union that included most of 
the union’s demands. With public support firmly 
behind the union and estimated losses of $30 
million per day during the strike, UPS had no 
other choice (Brecher 1997). 
Targeting the employer. As a means of 
achieving its goals, unions will often attempt to 
portray the employer it has targeted in a negative 
manner in the media and to the public. Unions 
may make the details of negotiations public, 
particularly as they relate to excessive demands by 
the employer in an attempt to garner public 
sympathy. An image conscious employer may be 
leery of widespread and prominent negative media 
coverage about a labor dispute, particularly if they 
anticipate the union’s demands to be perceived as 
reasonable by the public.   
Unions may also take a closer look at the 
companies’ financial records to determine the 
company’s profits, ability to pay wage increases 
and to determine the salaries of the company’s 
executives (Susser 1989). The United Steelworks 
of America undertook such research during their 
strike at the Ravenswood Aluminum Company 
(RAC) in October of 1990. During that campaign 
the Union tirelessly researched the company’s 
financials and discovered that fugitive financier 
Marc Rich owned a controlling interest in the 
company (Turner 2001).  The Union made sure 
this information was well publicized, including 
distributing “Wanted” flyers featuring Rich’s 
picture. The Union pressured Rich’s business 
operations in Europe and was able to block his 
attempt to purchase the Slovakian National 
Aluminum Company and a majority share of a 
Romanian hotel.  Shortly afterwards, Rich replace 
the senior management team at RAC and settled 
the contract with the union, bringing an end to the 
20-month strike (Turner 2001).  The settlement 
provided for a wage increase, cost of living 
increase and back pay for striking workers.   
Regulatory Charges. Unions can directly 
target an employer through an assortment of 
activities. As described earlier, union members can 
target the firm through work slowdowns, work-to-
rule actions and negative publicity. The Union 
may also target the employer through by filing 
charges with regulatory agencies that oversee any 
portion of the company’s industry. During the 162 
corporate campaigns identified Jarol B. Manheim 
between 1974 and 1999, labor unions filed charges 
with the following federal regulatory agencies in 
an attempt to pressure the employer and other 
company stakeholders: the Department of Justice, 
the Department of Labor, the Department of State, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, 
the Health Care Finance Administration, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Organization and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  
Charges of Unfair Labor Practices and health 
and safety violations against employers can be 
extremely influential during a corporate campaign. 
While employers are not prohibited from replacing 
economic strikers, they are prohibited from 
replacing employees who strike over an 
employer’s unfair labor practice(s) or health and 
safety violation(s) (Turner 2001). During the 
Steelworker’s campaign against the Ravenswood 
Aluminum Company, the Union filed a number of 
unfair labor charges and healthy and safety 
complaints against the company. The information 
had been meticulously documented over several 
years by a disgruntled union steward (Turner 
2001). As a result, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Organization ordered an unprecedented 
wall to wall inspection of RAC’s facilities and the 
National Labor Relations Board issued a 
complaint against the company (Turner 2001). The 
OSHA inspection eventually resulted in hundreds 
of thousands of dollars worth of fines, and 
undoubtedly provided Marc Rich with an even 
greater motive to settle with the union.   
OSHA was also involved in the 
Bridgestone/Firestone strike. In 1994 the 
organization issued a hefty fine against the 
company as a result of charges filed by the United 
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Rubber Workers during a strike. Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich hand delivered the notice to the 
company in a well-coordinated and highly 
publicized confrontation (Franklin 2001). The 
strike dragged on for two more years after the 
fines were levied and the company finally reached 
an agreement with the union in response to 
mounting criticism from the American public for 
sending jobs overseas (Brecher 1997).   
Boycotts and Picketing. As part of a corporate 
campaign, unions may boycott or picket an 
employer in an attempt to keep other workers and 
customers from patronizing the employer (Flynn 
2000). Secondary boycotts occur when a party to a 
labor dispute attempts to coerce a third party to 
take part in their boycott of an employer. 
Secondary boycotts are a violation the National 
Labor Relations Act (Susser 1989). However the 
United States Supreme Court has held that 
“publicity…for the purpose of truthfully advising 
the public, including consumers and members of a 
labor organization, that the product or products are 
produced by an employer with whom the labor 
organization has a primary dispute are distributed 
by another employer” is permitted (DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and 
Construction, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S.Ct. 1392 
(1988).  In that same case the Court has upheld 
hand billing in the absence or picketing or 
violence is permissible. In a successor to that case 
known as DeBartolo II, the court extended the 
rights of labor unions to target any company that 
has a business link to the employer with whom the 
union has a dispute. Employers who are 
particularly image conscious and sensitive to 
negative publicity may be more likely to yield if 
they perceive picketing or boycotting will be 
successful (Manheim 2001).   
Picketing proved to be an extremely effective 
tactic during the 2000 Justice for Janitors strike. 
As referenced earlier, the picketing took place at 
night so that it would not disrupt commuters. The 
constant picketing night after night kept the news 
media interested in the strike, thus keeping it in the 
public eye. In 2002 the International 
Longshoremen’s strike resulted in picket lines at 
ports across the country and millions of dollars in 
losses to shippers whose goods perished or were 
delayed as a result (Bonney 2003). Due to the 
skilled nature of the work, the strikers could not be 
replaced.  The monetary value of the loss of goods 
forced the shippers to settle the strike, despite the 
lack of public support for dockworkers.  
When members of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers struck Safeway grocery 
stores throughout California in 2003 during a 
strike, customers refrained from crossing the 
picket lines and shopped in other grocery stores in 
large numbers. As a customer relations tactic the 
stores had implemented “superior customer 
service” programs in most of its stress in the early 
1990s.  Superior Customer Service called on 
employees to anticipate customer needs, 
proactively help customers find products, suggest 
substitutes if products were out of stock and most 
importantly learn customers’ names. During the 
strike the union used extensive hand billing to 
inform customers about the dispute, particularly 
the company’s attempt to cut the health care 
benefits of its workers. In addition to picketing 
and hand billing the union also asked customers to 
sign pledge cards which stated that they would 
refrain from shopping at Safeway.  The strike 
lasted nine (9) days. After the strike was over and 
Safeway backed away from their demands to make 
significant changes to employee health coverage 
the Union stated publicly that they came away 
from the strike with a better contract than they had 
originally hoped for.  In the aftermath, both the 
union and management acknowledged two factors 
- the public sensitivity to health care and the 
familiarity that strikers had with customers as a 
result of the Superior Customer Service program 
as reasons why Safeway lost an alarming rate of 
business during the strike (Guy 2003).   
Targeting Board Members. 
Unions have had some success in targeting the 
board of directors for larger companies. Board 
members are charged with satisfying of 
stakeholders with different interests – employees 
and stockholders. Available resources influence a 
company’s decisions, especially as they try to 
remain profitable and satisfy stakeholders, which 
generally involves engaging in low risk behavior 
with relation to the companies practices (Jawahar 
& McLaughlin 2001). Members of Boards of 
directors are often a target of unions during a 
corporate campaign because they often serve in 
high capacities at other firms, making them 
Bergin-Corporate Campaigns 
 
10
vulnerable to union pressure (Susser 1989). Board 
members are often familiar with labor relations of 
the company as well as the details of the dispute. 
Because they are Board members they certainly 
hold a great deal of power when it comes to 
making decisions about that dispute. Unions will 
often threaten to handbill or picket a shareholders 
meeting in an attempt to embarrass and pressure 
Board members.   In the J.P. Stevens case cited 
earlier, an officer from the New York Life 
Insurance Company was forced to resign from J.P. 
Stevens Board of Directors because the ACTWU 
threatened to oppose his campaign form 
membership on the Board of Directors at New 
York Life (Susser 1989).  
Targeting business partners. 
Corporations build their reputations on the 
trust and confidence they gain from their 
stakeholders (Manheim 2001). This not only refers 
to a company’s employees and customers but also 
its investors, suppliers, vendors and partners. 
Evidence suggests that a strike can often have a 
negative effect on the firm’s investors and 
suppliers as a result of a loss in business (Pearsons 
1995). Companies that buy from or sell their 
products to the struck firm may also be negatively 
affected (DeFusco and Fuess 1991). A study of 
steel suppliers during automotive worker strikes 
demonstrated that the steel supplier’s profits were 
negatively affected by the slowdown in production 
caused by major strikes (Persons 1995).  
Additionally it has been shown that non-struck 
competitors sometimes enjoy increased business 
as a result of a strike (Kramer 1996). As a result, 
unions may also exert pressure on other companies 
that do business with the company they seek to 
target. During the Ravenswood Aluminum 
Company campaign the union used the 
information it had regarding Marc Rich to pressure 
beverage companies who used aluminum from 
Ravenswood to manufacture their product to find 
another supplier. The campaign also sought to 
inform the consumers of these manufacturers 
about RAC’s malfeasance. As a result, numerous 
beverage companies including Stroh’s and 
Budweiser stopped using RAC products (Turner 
2001). The loss of business undoubtedly provide 
March Rick and RAC with another reason to settle 
the strike with the union. 
Unions often control significant member 
pension funds, and a threat to withdraw those 
funds from an institution during a labor dispute 
can result in losses in the millions and billions of 
dollars for the financial institution if it is carried 
out. Such withdrawals are permissible provided 
that the assets are not adversely affected as a result 
(Susser 1989). The Amalgamated Clothing & 
Textile Workers Union threatened to withdraw $1 
billion in pension funds from the Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Company during the height of their 
dispute with J.P. Stevens because one of the 
bank’s executives was a member of J.P. Stevens 
Board of Directors. This lead to the resignation of 
the chief executive of Avon from the J.P. Stevens 
board. Shortly thereafter the chief executives of 
New York Life and J.P. Stevens resigned 
simultaneously from each other’s boards (Susser 
1989). The campaign lasted five long years, but in 
1980, J.P. Stevens finally agreed to union 
representation of its employees. 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Strike Funds.  
While not all corporate campaigns include a 
strike, many of the higher profile and successful 
campaigns discussed here did.  The shortage of 
funds for labor activities, including funds for 
striking workers, into the mid 1990s can account 
for some decline in the number of strikes as well 
as an increase in the number of union members 
who cross picket lines.  During the UPS strike 
referenced earlier, striking Teamsters received a 
$55 per week strike benefit from the union.  It is 
hard to imaging how long the workers would have 
lasted if the strike stretched on into months or 
years, as some of the other strikes discussed in this 
paper have.   
When the Los Angeles County Dry Wall 
workers strike in June of 1992, they began with 
almost unanimous support from union members. 
However as the strike stretched into its second 
month, many strikers started crossing the picket 
lines out of economic necessity. A strike fund was 
set up by the AFL-CIO and ultimately generated 
over $2 million in contributions that was used for 
strike funds.  Church and community groups 
donated food and money to assist to striking 
workers during the dispute. This kept the moral up 
and kept workers from crossing picket lines 
Schmidt Labor Research Center Seminar Research Series 11
(Turner 2001).  During the strike at Ravenswood 
Aluminum Company the spouses of the striking 
workers set up a support group to help with 
everything from financial needs to car pooling 
(Turner 2001).  Strikes can be financially 
devastating to workers and their families.  Strike 
funds and other forms of support provide the 
means necessary for union members to remain on 
the strike. 
Support from the AFL-CIO 
There is clear evidence that an increase in 
strike-related coverage by the media lead to an 
increase in public disapproval of labor unions 
(Erickson 1996).  When Ronald Reagan fired the 
striking PATCO members in 1980, the AFL-CIO 
sent letters to its affiliates discouraging them from 
showing solidarity with the fired employees. 
However, during the UPS strike in 1997 the AFL-
CIO threw its full support behind the striking 
workers, supporting them financially as well as by 
launching an all out public relations war against 
UPS (Yates 1998).  The AFL-CIO lent the 
Teamsters $10 million per week during the 15 day 
strike to support the strike fund (Brecher 1997)  It 
also joined with women’s groups to discuss how 
part time work affected women (Brecher 1997).  
As discussed earlier, the strike was a success for 
the Teamsters union, and the support that they 
received from the AFL-CIO, financially and 
otherwise undoubtedly provided a boost to the 
moral of striking workers. 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 
Do they help unions end labor disputes with 
favorable results?   
The traditional goal of a strike was to put 
economic pressure on employers to settle disputes 
(Masters 1997). During a corporate campaign 
labor unions attempt to apply pressure to 
employers through bearing pressure on their 
stakeholders by any means necessary, in turn 
forcing them to place pressure on employers 
(Manheim 2001). A corporate campaign, in 
conjunction with a strike or otherwise, is more 
likely to bring a favorable result to the union than 
a strike that does not have a long term strategy.  
The use of corporate campaigns by labor unions is 
on the rise, so much so that some companies have 
begun to limit their use through contractual 
negotiations.  J.P. Stevens, for example, insists on 
what is known as the Ray Rodgers Clause in all of 
its collective bargaining agreements.  The clause 
prohibits unions from engaging in corporate 
campaigns during a labor dispute (Manheim 
2001). Of course, barring any agreement to the 
contrary, unions are free to take part in such 
campaigns upon the expiration of the contract. 
There is no hard and fast model of a corporate 
campaign.  Each is different and depends upon the 
climate, objectives, economic realities and 
personalities of the participants.  Strategies and 
tactics must be well thought out in advance of any 
campaign and the appropriate groundwork must be 
put in place before the campaign begins for it to be 
successful. One needs to look no farther than the 
U.S. Airways sick-out during the past holiday 
season to grasp how an unplanned work action can 
backfire. The sick-out resulted in hundreds of 
cancelled flights and thousands of lost bags, 
causing customer outrage at the height of the 
Christmas travel season. The Department of 
Transportation has launched an inquiry to the 
debacle, and customers who spent their holiday 
stranded at airports across the country will long 
remember the union action that caused them to 
miss their holiday travel plans. One thing is clear - 
a well developed corporate campaign must include 
the following: company research, strategy 
development, political and community 
organization, media and public relations, and 
fundraising for strike funds if necessary to be 
successful. 
Corporate campaigns can have a long-standing 
effect on the mindset of the American public. Just 
as the American public remembers the PATCO 
strike as a blow to the labor movement, it will long 
remember the Teamsters victory over UPS during 
the strike in 1997.  The campaign against 
Ravenswood Aluminum Company will always be 
remembered because the union was able to track 
the company’s ownership to fugitive billionaire 
Marc Rich. But the campaigns that stand out the 
most are the Justice for Janitors campaigns that 
have become the new model for union strength 
and resurgence within the labor movement. The 
successful campaigns detailed in this paper, 
including the Justice for Janitors campaign, the 
Drywall workers strike in Los Angeles, the 1997 
UPS Strike, the California Grocery Workers strike, 
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J.P. Stevens and Ravenswood Aluminum 
Corporation demonstrate that any number of 
techniques can be used to apply pressure to 
employers. Striking in and of itself is rarely an 
effective tool in this day and age. Employers can 
simply replace striking workers. However a 
company that is dependant upon its stakeholders 
for survival will yield to pressure from those 
stakeholders and a successful corporate campaign, 
as demonstrated here, can provide the tools 
necessary for success. 
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